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THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF MINORITIES IN THE 
MONTENEGRIN DISPUTE OVER INDEPENDENCE 
 
Florian Bieber 
 
 
The possible disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serb-
Montenegrin tensions since 1997 stand out in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 
by both the lack of violence and the secondary role ethnicity plays in the dispute. 
While the conflict has historical roots in the relationship between Serbia and 
Montenegro and the incorporation of Montenegro into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes after World War One, its trigger was the policy of the Milošević regime 
towards the junior partner in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, established in May 
1992. The Montenegrin prime minister at the time and later president, Milo 
Djukanović, sought to position himself against the Belgrade authorities and pursued a 
course of greater autonomy for Montenegro, resulting in the demand for 
independence. Despite being triggered by the Milošević regime, the dispute did not 
end with the fall of Milošević on 5 October 2000. In fact, Serb-Montenegrin relations 
–  although there no longer was a threat of armed escalation through the Yugoslav 
authorities –  have deteriorated since the democratic changes in Serbia. Today, the 
conflict has taken on two distinct dimensions.  
 
First, it is a dispute between two conflicting views of Montenegro’s constitutional and 
political future among the citizens of Montenegro and the republic’s political elite. 
Most opinion polls of recent years have indicated that the population of Montenegro is 
nearly evenly split between supporters and opponents of independence. This split has 
led to a polarization of the political scene in the republic, where all other political 
issues have been subordinated to the single issue of statehood. Second, the conflict 
manifested itself in the relations between the government of Montenegro and the 
government of Yugoslavia, which the Montenegrin authorities have not recognized to 
date. Relations to the Serbian government have also been dominated by the question 
of Montenegro’s separation from Yugoslavia, but both the more pragmatic leadership 
of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić and the absence of the question of 
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legitimacy of his government, have rendered relations easier. While the latter conflict 
has brought about considerable institutional instability and prevented Yugoslav 
institutions from undergoing a process of reform after the fall of Milošević, it is the 
inner-Montenegrin tensions which have produced most friction on a broader level.  
 
Several instances in recent years, with the latest occurring during the Serbian New 
Year’s celebrations on 13/14 January 2002 in Podgorica and elsewhere in 
Montenegro, have pointed to the possibility of a violent confrontation between 
opponents and supporters of an independent Montenegro.1 Political choice and 
national identity are closely intertwined in Montenegro, reflecting the complexity of 
Montenegrin identity.  
 
Minorities in Montenegro (over a quarter of the population) and in the border region 
of Sandžak and their political representatives have not, however, been the driving 
forces in the inner-Montenegrin dispute.   
 
Ethnic Group Number Percentage 
Montenegrins 380,467 61,86 
Muslims 89,614 14,57 
Serbs 57,453 9,34 
Albanians 40,415 6,57 
Croats 6,244 1,02 
Others 40,842 6,64 
Total 615,035 100 
    Ethnic Communities in Montenegro, 19912 
 
Interethnic relations in Montenegro have been considerably better throughout the 
process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration than in most other republics. The victory of 
Milo Djukanović in the internal power struggle with Momir Bulatović in 1997/98 
                                                 
1  Beta, 14.1.2002. 
2  Numbers from the last Yugoslav census. Note that self-identification has probably changed 
considerably over the past decade. The number of Serbs in Montenegro is likely to be 
considerably higher today. Medija Centar, Statisticki Vodic. Izbori 2000-Jugoslavija (Belgrade: 
Medija Centar, 2000), 12. 
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resulted in an improvement in majority-minority relations after the more repressive 
climate of the early 1990s. This shift was both programmatic and pragmatic. The 
narrow victory of Djukanović over Bulatović in the presidential elections in 1997 
required his party to reach out to minorities to secure stable political support. On a 
programmatic level, Djukanović and the governments dominated by his Democratic 
Party of Socialists (DPS) have sought to build a domestic coalition for greater 
autonomy and eventually independence, which necessitated the inclusion of 
minorities. In addition, the (hesitant) reforms of the authorities effectively led to a 
departure from the more hostile policy towards minorities of the previous years. 
Parties supporting Montenegrin independence emphasize the good state of interethnic 
relations and seek to explain the current absence of major tensions through a history 
of ethnic tolerance to be found in an independent Montenegro, thus seeking to 
strengthen the case for secession. Parties favouring a continued union with 
Yugoslavia also generally recognize the relatively good state of interethnic relations, 
but frequently view minorities with suspicion and as possible secessionists or question 
their loyalty.  
 
Despite a hostile climate towards Bošniaks/Muslims3 in Sandžak during the early 
1990s, especially in the Serbian part of the region, relations never deteriorated to the 
degree of outright violence against minorities in Montenegro.4 Frequently the 
minorities of Montenegro, both Bošniaks/Muslims and Albanians, have been the 
target of either pro-Yugoslav parties in Montenegro or representatives of the former 
governing parties and other nationalist forces in Serbia. In one of his last speeches as 
Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milošević accused the Bosniak/Muslim population of 
Sandžak of pursuing a secessionist agenda.5 Occasionally, Socialist Party of Serbia 
(SPS) members and representatives of the Party of Serbian Unity, which entered the 
                                                 
3  Here both the term Bošniaks and Muslim are used to describe the Serbian-speaking Slav 
population  (Bosnian, Croatian) of Muslim religious background. As there is no consensus over 
self-identification, both terms are used here. On this issue see Bohdana Dimitrova, “Bosniak or 
Muslim? Dilemma of one Nation with two Names”, Southeast European Politics 2 (October 
2001), 94-108. 
4  See Humanitarian Law Centre, Spotlight on: Human Rights Violations in Times of Armed 
Conflict (Belgrade 1995); Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Minorities in Serbia 
(Belgrade 2000), 96-99. 
5  International Crisis Group, Yugoslavia Situation Report No. 1, 4.10.2000. His speech is 
reprinted in Beta Daily News, 3.10.2000; Politika, 17-18.9.2000. 
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Serbian parliament in the December 2000 elections, engaged in attacks against 
Bošniaks/Muslims, especially against the Federal Minister for Ethnic and National 
Communities, Rasim Ljajić.6 While these statements did not pose a direct threat to 
interethnic relations, they served as a reminder of the political worldview of the 
largest opposition parties in Serbia. More important, and more dangerous, have been 
the attacks against minorities launched by political parties and the media in 
Montenegro. In fact, observers note that anti-minority rhetoric increased in the months 
after the fall of Milošević in Montenegro.7 
 
The anti-minority statements by some pro-Yugoslav politicians were primarily 
motivated by the narrow gap between supporters and opponents of Montenegrin 
independence, or as B92 wrote in April 2001 on a survey on the question of 
independence: “Montenegro's future will not be decided by ethnic Montenegrins but 
by the republic's minority Muslim, Croat and Albanian population, according to 
survey results… the referendum results would depend on the polarizing of Croats, 
Albanians and Muslims on one side with pro-Serbia and pro-Yugoslavia 
Montenegrins on the other.”8 Therefore, representatives of the “Coalition for 
Yugoslavia” have repeatedly questioned the right of minorities to decide on the status 
of Montenegro.9 While no political party directly advocated disenfranchising 
minorities, the message carried especially during the electoral campaign in April 2001 
was that any referendum won with the votes of minorities alone would not be 
considered legitimate.10 These statements made by representatives of the Socialist 
People’s Party (SNP), the People’s Party (NS) and the Serbian People’s Party (SNS) 
effectively precluded the already minimal support of minorities for a continuation of 
Yugoslavia. In addition to the narrow gap between supporters and opponents of the 
                                                 
6  Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Annual Report 2000, (Belgrade 2001), 
available at www.helsinki.org.yu; Humanitarian Law Center, Complaint                            
Against SPS Official for Incitement of Ethnic Hatred, 3.7.2001, 
http://www.hlc.org.yu/english/minorities/mminorities2.htm. 
7  Rifat Rastoder, deputy speaker of the Montenegrin parliament and a Bošniak/Muslim himself, 
noted pressure and hate speech against Bošniaks/Muslims during 2001. Montena-Fax, 
13.11.2001. 
8  B92 Daily News Bulletin, 16.4.2001. 
9  Esad Kocan, “Hate Speech as an Election Message. Children of a Lesser God”, AIM Podgorica, 
27.2.2001; ICG, “Montenegro Time to Decide: Pre-election Briefing”, 18.4.2001, 7. 
10  See Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Albanians in Montenegro, April 2001, 
www.helsinki.org.yu/hcs/HCSreport20010508.htm. 
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independence of Montenegro, the anti-minority rhetoric by members of the pro-
Yugoslav coalition was a reflection of a nationalist worldview they sought to appeal 
to.11 
 
In addition to the political parties, some of the Montenegrin media have openly 
attacked minorities and sought to play up the threat of ethnic conflict. It is important 
to note that especially the dailies in Montenegro are strictly divided between papers 
supporting the pro-independence line of the government (Pobjeda, Vijesti) and those 
supporting the line of the pro-Yugoslav opposition. Glas Crnagor(a)ca (Voice of 
Montenegro/Montenegrins) emerged as the daily closest to the SNP, after the editorial 
team of Dan (Day), and mostly supported Momir Bulatović in the power struggle over 
the party leadership in early 2001. Both dailies have maintained a similarly critical 
line towards the government and engaged in hate speech towards minorities. In 
particular, both have repeatedly accused Albanians of planning an uprising as in 
Macedonia and of seeking secession from Montenegro.12 In addition, outright hate 
speech against minorities has been common in both publications.13 One incident in 
August 2001 particularly highlighted the attempts of the media to polarize ethnic 
relations. In the Plav municipality, close to the Kosovo border, one logger was killed 
and one was injured in an attempt to steal the equipment and earnings from the forest 
workers.14 The robbers had crossed the border from Kosovo (where similar robberies 
had taken place) and were apparently Albanians, while the victims were 
Montenegrins. This circumstance was exploited by Dan and Glas Crnagor(a)ca to 
warn of an Albanian threat to Montenegro. In an article published shortly after the 
                                                 
11  The SNP supported Milošević until 5 October 2000, including his policies in Kosovo. Although 
a change of leadership took place in early 2001, the party remains tied to a nationalist political 
worldview, combined with an overall reluctance towards economic and social reforms. The NS 
(and the SNS which split off the NS) have been opposed to Milošević, but frequently supported 
a nationalist line, especially during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia.  
12  In fact, the reporting of the two dailies follows similarly speculative articles published in the 
Belgrade media. Veseljko Koprivica, “Is Montenegro Threatened by the Albanians?”, AIM 
Podgorica, 8.7.2001. After the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, a 
number of Belgrade tabloids and nationalist publications published articles warning of terrorist 
threats emanating from Albanians and Bošniaks/Muslims. See ICG, “Bin Laden and the 
Balkans. The Politics of Anti-Terrorism”, 9.11.2001, 25-27. 
13  Center for Democracy and Human Rights, Transition in Montenegro (Legislation, Media, 
Privatization), No. 9 (January-March 2001), 21-22. 
14  AFP, 25.8.2001; DPA, 28.8.2001. Subsequently not only the Montenegrin authorities but also 
the Federal Ministry of Defence noted that there was no threat of Albanian ‘extremism’ , DPA, 
7.9.2001. 
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incident, Dan reconstructed the events from the perspective of one of the survivors 
and gave ample space to comments of the inhabitants of the nearest village Velika. 
Their statements were left without comment, thus following a frequently used 
technique of disguising prejudice or a political agenda behind an alleged ‘vox populi’ . 
The voice of the ordinary co-national gives the content more legitimacy.15 One of the 
emphases here was on the ethnic motivation for the crime committed: “It isn’t 
important that the murdered man was from Bosnia; the important thing is that the 
murdered man was a Serb.” Furthermore, Albanians, exclusively called ‘ Š iptars’16, 
are seen as a collective threat to Serbs in that area: “The Š iptars on the other side of 
the border know everything about us. I have no idea who provides them with 
information.” Finally, the quotes identify the government as being responsible for not 
having taken the “Albanian threat” seriously: “They [the government] are constantly 
saying that the Š iptars will leave Montenegro alone”.17 The instrumentalization of this 
robbery for political gain echoed an earlier incident in March 2001 when pro-UÇK 
graffiti appeared in the districts of Plav and Gusinje, where similarly media and 
political parties cultivated the fear of an imminent Albanian rebellion.18 
 
In contrast to other republics of the former Yugoslavia, the main potential line of 
conflict in Montenegro lies between populations of the same ethnicity with different 
political choices and not between different ethnic communities. While the analogy of 
the war in Macedonia in 2001 has and can be instrumentalized in this dispute, the 
minority-majority relations remain a function of relations across the political divide of 
the dominant ethnic community.  
 
A particular danger arises from the deliberate mobilization of such fears by the media 
and political parties. The overall number of anti-minority incidents in Montenegro 
over the past years has been altogether small in comparison to most neighbouring 
                                                 
15  This technique was one of the key characteristics of nationalist mobilization in the Serbian 
media during the rise of Milošević in the late 1980s. See for example the recently published 
study Aljosa Mimica und Radina Vucetic, Vreme kada je narod govorio [The time the people 
talked] (Belgrade: Fond za humanitarno pravo, 2001). 
16  “Š iptari” is a derogatory Serbian term for Albanians. 
17  All quotes are from Dan, 26.8.2001. 
18  See Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Albanians in Montenegro, April 2001, 
www.helsinki.org.yu/hcs/HCSreport20010508.htm. 
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countries. Given the fact that the prime political divisions in Montenegro do not 
follow ethnic lines, there is additional reason to believe that a repetition of violent 
interethnic tensions, as has been the case in most countries of the region, can be 
avoided in Montenegro. The fundamental divide between supporters of Yugoslavia 
and of an independent Montenegro has, however, run the risk of also adversely 
affecting interethnic relations in the country. A referendum campaign, even if it were 
to be based on the recent EU proposals for reconstructing the relations between the 
two republics, will have the question of independence at its symbolical core. Any 
campaign for a referendum, if it is to take place, is likely to produce a volatile climate 
in which ethnicity can be instrumentalized by political leaders and the media to 
increase support for a particular outcome of the referendum. In addition, the possible 
uncertainty following a referendum is similarly a period where isolated incidents, be 
they related to ethnicity or merely linked by the ethnic background of those involved, 
can spark a broader downturn in ethnic relations.  At the same time, the recently 
voiced suggestion of not having a referendum at all, but to follow the ‘Czechoslovak’  
model can hardly be considered a viable option.19 In fact, a solution without a 
referendum might not reflect the popular will of a majority of citizens of either 
republic, as was the case in Czechoslovakia. Instead, a polarization and possible 
attacks against minorities could be avoided with greater emphasis on the process of 
consensus-building and by ensuring a broadly accepted referendum.20 
 
Policy Recommendations 
 
The United States and the European Union in their attempts to mediate an end to the 
constitutional and political crisis of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia focused on 
negotiations between the Montenegro and the Serbian/Yugoslav government. There is 
a need, however, for increased awareness for the dispute over the final status within 
Montenegro. As Western meditation seeks to ensure stability in the region, and to 
                                                 
19  Montenegrin Prime Minister Filip Vujanovic made the suggestion in February 2002. MNToday, 
17.2.2002. 
20  This point was also emphasized by the Serbian deputy Prime Minister Zarko Korac. He 
critizised the EU for advocating a particular outcome instead of securing conditions for a 
referendum: “[T]he international community would have to concentrate on conditions for 
holding a referendum and defining criteria for declaring its success instead of trying to influence 
Podgorica via Belgrade.” FoNet, 23.1.2002. 
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further democratization and strengthen the rule of law in both republics, the inner-
Montenegrin lines of conflict require more attention. Especially interethnic relations 
might deteriorate during the process of clarifying the future status of Montenegro. 
Such a development would be a grave threat to democracy and stability in 
Montenegro, Serbia and the neighbouring countries, and needs to be avoided. In order 
to prevent such a development, the following steps should be considered: 
 
–  Ensure that the interests of minorities are taken into account during the 
negotiations between Montenegro and Serbia/Yugoslavia over the final 
status of Montenegro. This can be achieved either by including minority 
representatives directly or by establishing an additional consultative forum 
where minority representatives from both republics, especially from the 
Sandžak region, can formulate their concerns. 
 
–  Seek guarantees from political elites in Montenegro (and Serbia) not to 
instrumentalize minorities in the campaigns for a referendum or early 
elections. Such pressure would include breaking off contacts with 
politicians who openly engage in hate speech against minorities. 
 
–  Focus stronger on the process of negotiations and less on the outcome. To 
date, the international community’s strategy has been to endorse the 
preservation of Yugoslavia as preferred outcome. This support for one 
outcome is often perceived as support for the political representatives of 
this option in Montenegro. As long as key members of the pro-Yugoslav 
coalition in Montenegro attack minorities or question their right to 
participate in a referendum, the position of the international community 
should seek to make  a stronger distinction between its preferred outcome, 
i.e. the preservation of Yugoslavia, and the proponents of this option in 
Montenegro.  
 
–  Facilitate a consensus-seeking process in Montenegro in the preparation of 
the resolution of its final status. Both the Council of Europe and the OSCE 
in Montenegro have sought to provide advice and monitor legal reforms, 
including proposed referendum laws. Such activities should be 
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strengthened and international actors should thus strengthen their role on 
the ground. 
 
–  The media have played a negative role by publishing sensationalist reports 
about minority terrorist threats. The international community should both 
support the further professionalization of the media and back human rights 
and other organizations monitoring media reporting in Montenegro to 
detect and help prevent the dissemination of hate speech. 
 
–  The Yugoslav, Serbian and Montenegrin governments have all signalled 
their readiness to reform the current legal framework to better 
accommodate minorities. These efforts are exemplified by the proposal for 
a new law on minorities at the federal level. There is a danger, however, 
that these reforms are slowed down by the continued uncertainty of the 
legal status of Montenegro. Concerted efforts should be undertaken to 
ensure that this process of reform is not stalled and both republics initiate 
a new legal framework for the protection of minorities and their inclusion 
in the political system.  
